Building together / buildings together by Kolb, David
By way of an Introduction:  These pages contain individual chapters from my 1990 
book, Postmodern Sophistications. I have obtained the rights to the essays am 
making them available separately. The entire text of the book is also available on 
Research Gate.  
The underlying aim of this collection of essays was to question the opposition 
between the Sophists and Plato. That classic dispute has been the model for many 
discussions of tensions within our society:: on the one hand you have the clever 
manipulative salesmen who care nothing about truth. On the other hand the 
rigorous scientific investigation that never quite makes contact with politics. 
Rootless nihilism vs. naturally grounded values. Anarchy vs. Rules. 
In this book I developed a pragmatic middleground, using themes from Heidegger 
and Dewey; in later writings I rely more on Hegel. But the point remains the same: 
don't listen to the Straussians and others who try to force on our politics or art or 
philosophy a simple opposition between truth-loving traditionalists (Socrates) and 
flaky relativistic postmoderns (the Sophists). It was not so simple in Greece and it's 
not so simple today. 
Part of the book deals with postmodern critiques of rational knowledge, with 
Lyotard and Habermas on center stage. Their opposition between postmodern and 
modern views remains relevant, although post-1990 developments in 
deconstruction and critical theory have widened and deepened the debate. The 
points made in these essays remain useful, if not complete. 
The second part of the book deals with architecture. The word postmodern has 
gone out of fashion in architecture. But the earlier use of the term for an attempt to 
bring substantive content into formal modernity retains important.   
My conclusions about postmodern architecture's failute to escape modern distance 
from history also remain true, as does my argument that that proclaimed modern 
distance from history is itself an illusion, that we are more embedded in history than 
the moderns wanted to think, although that embodiment is not as total and 
restrictive as we have imagined true of our ancestors. 
If you find any of these ideas useful, true, provocative, let me know. If you find 
them absurd or useless airy nothings, I'd still be delighted to learn from your 
reactions. 
David Kolb, January 2018
Charles A. Dana Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Bates College
davkolb@gmail.com, www.dkolb.org, mobile 547 868 4713
This final essay asks how we bring together the multiple dimensions of our historical 
location.
 14. Building Together / Buildings Together 
 We have to build together since our products refuse to stand apart. Despite what is 
said in the critiques of modernity, we need to be mindful of the whole. Unlike the other 
arts in which totality has been attacked, architecture exists in a finite real space. Buildings 
stand together in the space of our daily activities, not only in the space created by 
criticism and artistic reference. Like texts and paintings, buildings may have complex 
relations one to another, with all the "intertextuality" desired, but buildings also stand 
immobile blocking one another's view. One painting does not have to be demolished to 
make room for another. Places cannot ignore one another completely; too much must be 
shared by way of services and infrastructure. A city forms a whole no matter what we do, 
and we live with the results. So even if we are opposed to the notion of a total vision, we 
have to care for the city as a whole. But what is this care that is not a total vision?
 With this question we return to issues raised earlier with the Sophists and the 
Habermas/Lyotard debate. Can we be self-critical without a universal project? Socrates 
either never finishes, or appears as one more cabal. If his wisdom is unavailable, we might 
try liberal tolerance, but the city cannot be cared for by the simple principle of respecting 
one another's projects. There is not enough space and time, and we share too much. Your 
building may overshadow mine, or strain the transit system, or destroy the scale. When 
mutual respect gives way to regulation and bargaining, the planning czars become only 
another voice in the crowd, since there are many kinds of force that can be brought to 
bear by all the parties concerned. Lyotard's more avant-garde vision of justice also fails in 
the city context; faced with building together (rather than against) it reduces to a liberalism 
that does not demand internal self-criticism.
 I have urged self-criticism by metaphorical extension and rereading the past. In our 
world of many languages and forms of life, we need a multiplicity of interactions and a 
care for the whole, but how do we build that?[begin note]  Jencks contends that "the truth 
of city building today is that good architecture and good urbanism are opposed. . . . good 
architects, like good artists, are primarily concerned with the language of form, while good 
urbanists must have an equal commitment to the things that erode such a language: 
compromise, democracy, pluralism, entrepreneurial skill and patience" (1987, 258-9). No 
one can deny the difficulty of the problems of building together, but they are not helped 
by a modernist isolation of the language of form, even if this is the way most architects are 
trained. 
Is there a Postmodern World?
 One way to unify the whole is to demand that it express some unified spirit of the 
age. Buildings gather up our world, and if we feel our world is distinctive we may want a 
distinctive new style. So it was in the nineteenth century's search for a style appropriate to 
their perception that a new age had dawned (cf. Crook, 1987). So it was again with the 
modern movement's claim that the new technological and democratic world demanded a 
new purity in design. Celebrating that new world turned out to be difficult, since 
bureaucracy and power kept slipping into what were supposed to embody progress and 
democracy.
 So it is that postmoderns now claim the world has changed again and needs a new 
architecture. The self-consciously pluralistic world needs eclectic historical references, 
twisting and colliding styles, and irony that calls attention to itself. Again there has been a 
problem with what is being celebrated, the quoted historical traditions or the self-
consciousness that does the quoting. Does postmodernism reveal our continuity with 
traditional worlds, or does it level all traditions into a bland availability for consumption? 
Can it care for the whole, or only flatten it out?
 With these questions we return to the issue Hegel raised in speaking of "the 
substance of consciousness." The modernists claimed that there was no longer any 
substantial content inherent in our lives. Self and society were freed from the limitations of 
tradition, and without any except pragmatic restrictions we faced an indefinitely open field 
of possibilities; this would find its embodiment in an architecture of pure form.
 Postmodern writers reject these claims to purity and universality. I argued, 
however, that in important ways many postmoderns continue modernism. Both 
presuppose a version of distanced subjectivity (rational or ironic). Weber's detached 
manipulative subject returns in the guise of the chameleon architect who seeks to embody 
the postmodern condition in building forms that treat all history as equally accessible.
 Notice that both modernists and postmodernists share the presupposition that there 
is a unified theme to our world that ought to be expressed in our buildings. While they 
proclaimed a revolution against nineteenth century historical styles, the modernist 
pioneers agreed that it was the business of the architect to express the spirit of the age.
Modern architecture] is based on the same Victorian presuppositions about 
architecture as undergirded the Gothic revival more than a century ago: it 
results, that is, from a self-conscious attempt by the architect to invent a 
style that will express what he presumes to be the unifying spirit of his age 
and that will at the same time (paradoxically enough) propagate and 
inculcate that spirit in a recalcitrant populace which grievously lacks it. 
(Smith 1971, 81)
Here are a series of nineteenth and twentieth century statements of that 
presupposition:
1808: The design of almost every age and country has a peculiar 
character . . . [every house] should maintain the character of a house of 
the age and country in which it is erected. (Richard Payne Knight, quoted 
in Crook 1987, 30)
1860: [We need] an indigenous style of our own for this age of new 
creations. (Thomas Harris, quoted in Crook 1987, 138)
1863: [Is] the nineteenth century condemned to end without ever 
possessing an architecture of its own? Is it to transmit to posterity nothing 
but pastiches and hybrids? (Viollet-le-Duc, quoted in Crook 1987, 85)
1902: Art as the commentator or the recorder of human life, reflecting not 
only its physical aspects but its mental attitude . . . registers the prevailing 
sentiments of its period. (Walter Crane, in the Arts and Crafts Movement, 
quoted in Smith 1971, 16)
1906: At no time and in no instance has Architecture been other than an 
index of the flow of the thought of the people--an emanation from the 
inmost life of the people. (Louis Sullivan, quoted in Smith 1971, 16)
1923: The character of an epoch is epitomized in its buildings. . . . A vital 
architectural spirit, rooted in the entire life of a people, represents the 
interrelation of all phases of creative effort, all arts, all techniques. (Walter 
Gropius, quoted from Smith 1971, 21).
1923: A great epoch has begun. There exists a new spirit. . . . Style is a 
unity of principle animating all the work of an epoch, the result of a state 
of mind which has its own special character. (Le Corbusier 1931, 3)
1983: The world now emerging is searching freely in memory, because it 
knows how to find its own "difference" in the removed repetitions and 
utilization of the entire past. (Portoghesi 1983, 13)
 The delicate question is this: are we now living in a world whose unified meaning is 
a new kind of multiplicity and mixture? Or does that multiplicity mean that we are not 
living in a world with a unified meaning at all?
 What is the difference between saying that we live in a world whose unified theme 
is multiplicity, and saying that we do not live in a unified world? The difference is that in 
the second case irony (or any other meta-attitude) is not required as the expression of the 
true spirit of the age, for there is no spirit of the age to express. There is no special attitude 
one must have towards one's local practices or vocabulary in order to be fully in accord 
with the age. There is nothing that must be expressed along with the local language.
 The claim that our age has a unified spirit seems obvious until one tries to prove it.  
I argue elsewhere that the notion that we live in one deeply unified world is a mistake 
whether it is applied to traditional society, the modern world, or to the postmodern 
condition (see Kolb 1986, chapters 11-12).  Testing all the details of our age would be an 
endless task. Citing a few typical or metonymic examples does not prove a universal spirit. 
No social-scientific investigation could establish such a strong claim. The symptoms cited 
by Lyotard, Baudrillard, and others may exist; the question is whether they prove a 
universal condition. In fact the claim can only be supported by some elaborate 
philosophical scaffolding, usually Hegelian or Heideggerian, whose soundness is itself 
deeply suspect. Once that scaffolding is seen for what it is, the most we can claim is that 
there may be some very large-scale processes and movements, but they exist together with 
others and have no guaranteed primacy.
 This means that there is no modernist or postmodernist platform from which one 
can survey in principle the limits of local practices and languages without the confronting 
those limits by working in the local languages. It means that vernacular architecture need 
not be a naive decline from self-consciousness. Nor is "invisible" architecture necessarily a 
second-rate form. You are not missing some essence of the postmodern world when you 
use the local vocabulary, with awareness that there are others but without ironic 
commentary. The limits of the local language become apparent as you speak, and you can 
try to extend that language.
 You can be straightforward. But you will always be in context with other forms of 
life; there is no escaping the awareness of diversity. But there is no requirement that you 
signal that awareness in your every act of building.
 On the other hand, none of this means that there is a requirement of 
straightforwardness. Saying that we can be simple does not mean that we should all be 
fundamentalists. To claim that there is no unified spirit of our age may seem to imply that 
there are at least some smaller unities. But that does not necessarily follow. I suggested 
earlier that the many forms of life are not isolated or insulated worlds, or even internally 
unified. The individual exists as an intersection of many languages and practices; there is 
no automatic unity on any level, no unity that has only external relations with other 
unities. If there is no unified spirit of the age, neither is there a single unified spirit of 
America, or of Chicago, or of a Polish-American neighborhood--which is not to say that 
these have no characters of their own. We are all strifes and dialogues, but we are not 
shapeless. This multiplicity is not neat; it does not form a list; it is not made up of items 
with clean boundaries. Identities overlap and exceed as stories twist.
 And that does not mean that the multiple worlds do not have to deal with one 
another, or measure up to new facts, or to the consequences of their values, to the 
intersection of practices, or to what the neighbors think. Or to their own internal diversity. 
These are issues people have always had to face, and there are good and bad ways of 
facing them.
 We are not simply products nor simply members of anything. What it means to be 
"in" a language or a community already involves inner spaciousness and openness to what 
I have called metaphorical change. Our selves are constituted at and as the intersection of 
multiple language games and practices that are themselves internally multiple, the result of 
previous extensions and blendings. And if there is no place from which the multiplicity 
within and among us makes a uniquely ordered whole, that does not mean that the 
multiplicity is totally indeterminate, or that we see it from no where.
 We can know that our lives have many contingent forms, without having to 
constantly advertise that fact as the unified meaning of our lives. But that fact must 
influence us, nonetheless. What does it mean to live such a world, if it does not mean you 
must adopt an ironic stance toward any given language or form of life? It means self-
criticism. But how do we build that, together?
The Problem of Jumble
History may not make a whole, and within ourselves and in society there may be 
no neat order. But when we act, we act together. When we build, we build next to one 
another. Intellectual and cultural space may have a strange discontinuous topology, but 
physical space remains stubbornly finite and continuous. Our buildings will stand together 
whether we do or not.
 So the modern movement had some point in decreeing the abolition of historical 
jumble. What was imperialistic about modernist planning was the message that demands 
for historical continuity and tradition were part of the past. When a new building seemed 
disconnected or unintelligible, it was up to us to change. This sounds elitist and it was.
 The moderns oscillated between the total plan that rigidly controlled every aspect 
of the city, and the practice of making each building an isolated monument with no regard 
for its neighbors. There are, however, more kinds of architectural whole than these. Colin 
Rowe's eloquent attack on modernist planning points to other wholes, especially his 
"collage city" where many intentions and small domains coexist without being neatly 
integrated (Rowe 1976). Most postmodern architects have embraced some descendant of 
this picture, although there ought to be some difference between a collage and an 
arbitrary collection of objects.
 We are left with the jumbled cities the moderns were trying to avoid and to which 
they finally contributed. We cannot solve the problem of jumble by returning to some 
imagined uniform community and a hierarchical set of building types. Should we then just 
learn to love what we have?
 Around many cities, towers rise here and there, separately and in small clusters, 
above a carpet of low-rise buildings and tree-shaded streets. The overall outline is 
reminiscent of Le Corbusier's dream city of neatly separated perfect towers rising above a 
park. But these are not modernist forms: these buildings are in competition for tenants, so 
each strives to be different from the rest. At the feet of the towers lies neither Le 
Corbusier's park nor Jane Jacob's urban mix, but tract housing, condo developments, and 
commercial strips.
 Is this a satisfactory urban form? People are buying the condos and flocking to the 
malls; is this what they want? If we are suspicious of the elitism of the modernists, we 
should be slow to condemn recent developments. One might argue that the new suburban 
(some have called them "post-suburban") centers are a new community arrangement that 
we have yet to learn to do well. Why not let the normal forces of markets and popular 
dynamics take their natural course? Here is a typical defense:
People forget that Venice was built by hook or by crook. Venice was as 
mercantilist as Tysons [a suburban center outside Washington]. It was full 
of land speculators and developers. The merchants' primary concern was 
about the flow of goods, of traffic. Those who now romanticize Venice 
collapse 1000 years of history. Venice is a monument to a dynamic 
process, not great urban planning. It is hard for us to imagine, but the 
architectural harmony of the Piazza San Marco was an accident. It was 
built over centuries by people who were constantly worried whether they 
had enough money. (Dennis Romano, quoted in the Washington Post, 
Sunday, June 19, 1988, p. A16.)
This quote is misleading in the usual American way: it pictures the only options as 
centralized planning or the free market. Those who produced the buildings around the 
Piazza San Marco looked at the whole they were making. They did not make context-
ignoring monuments or ironic rhapsodies.
 The defense of sprawl and jumble continues: people will get the cities they want; if 
they wanted more they could protest. The architect should speak the people's language, 
doing it a little better, adding some art, but not assuming the role of Cultural Tutor.
 This sounds reasonable, but like all invocations of the invisible hand it ignores the 
fact of differential access to power. In our age the sources of decision about building are 
not easily located or influenced when people want to mount a protest. We are not 
necessarily "the people" who "want" what we get. Architecture is reduced to its 
commercial common denominator, a shapeless mass now resurfaced with historical 
goodies. We live amid the results by learning not to look, but we owe ourselves an 
environment that we can respect.
 The aesthetic and planning consequences of the laissez-faire position have often 
been associated with Robert Venturi's slogans that "Main Street is almost all right" and that 
we should "learn from Las Vegas." In their defense of popular culture Venturi and Scott 
Brown do oppose the elitism of "European critics" who see "consumer folk culture" as only 
"the manufactured fantasies of mass taste." In line with American populism and 
pragmatism they see people's preferences as something to be trusted, especially on those 
occasions when those preferences can be manifested in a less constrained environment.
Why must architects continue to believe that when "the masses" are 
"educated" they'll want what the architects want? Why do we turn to exotic 
folk cultures, as interpreted by other architects . . . rather than learning 
directly from the cultures around us? (Venturi and Scott Brown 1984, 35)
Venturi's position is more nuanced than appears from the way he is often cited. He 
does emphasize the need to abandon dreams of formal purity and to learn from the vitality 
and complexity of the actual urban landscape. He insists that the contemporary city can 
teach us not to oversimplify. Variety has its price, however; in our world we cannot 
develop a new building type for every function and every group. Instead Venturi 
encourages a symbolic architecture of "decorated sheds," plain forms with applied 
decoration that advertises history and current use. We should deal with pluralism by 
allowing symbols, rather than forms, to proliferate. The whole becomes an assemblage of 
symbols in space.
If you ignore signs as 'visual pollution,' you are lost. If you look for 
'spaces between buildings' in Las Vegas, you are lost. If you see the 
buildings of urban sprawl as forms making space, they are pathetic--mere 
pimples in an amorphous landscape. As architecture, urban sprawl is a 
failure; as space, it is nothing. It is when you see the buildings as symbols 
in space, not forms in space, that the landscape takes on quality and 
meaning. And when you see no buildings at all, at night when virtually 
only the illuminated signs are visible, you see the Strip in its pure 
state" (Venturi and Scott Brown 1984, 63)
. This dematerialized cityscape fits well with discussions by Baudrillard and others 
about our dissolution into simulacra. But buildings have both more solidity and more 
variability to their being than that talk allows.[end note]
 The symbols need not be clamorous in the Las Vegas manner. Venturi's design for 
the new wing of the National Gallery in London shows the subtlety of his approach. The 
building is a simple mass decorated on each facade to match the neighborhood that the 
side faces. This "serial contextualism" allows the building to avoid competing with the 
famous monuments in the vicinity, while quietly "calling attention at every turn to its own 
polite behavior" (Boles 1987).
 Yet Venturi's symbolic method could lead to a second-level uniformity, where all 
buildings displayed themselves in the same manner no matter how different their logos 
might be. Compared to that strategy, the postmodern attempt to discover new building 
forms or rework old ones offers more variation of type, but it makes for more another kind 
of clutter. While individual programs and sites might respond to the needs and histories 
and taste cultures of the clients, the whole city would not cohere. Disneyland does have a 
greater variety of building forms than Las Vegas, but is it a solution to the problem of 
jumble?
 One might claim that the many different architectural forms in a postmodern city 
could be unified by their common ironic tone. I argued, however, that the kind of irony 
associated with most postmodern meta-theories creates only a decorated version of the 
modernist city, which either lacks coherence or imposes far too much uniformity.
 It is possible to build a public space that celebrates and yet remains ironic. 
Moore's Piazza d'Italia in New Orleans seemed to have worked well for the local Italian 
community. The ironies that it proclaimed to the knowledgeable critic did not seem to 
bother the local inhabitants; this is an example of Jencks's double coding. We should 
worry, however, that such showy postmodern historicism works best in commercial 
buildings where what is celebrated is consumption and fantasy. Kenneth Frampton 
attacked these as "cardboard scenography" such "never-ending fashionable 
displays" (Frampton 1982, 76).
Frampton is sweeping in his condemnation. He lumps together the populism he 
attributes to Venturi, the ironic historicism of Moore, the deconstructive experiments of 
Eisenman, and Gehry's dissections of form. But these move in different directions and 
respond to different problems. The first two are concerned to manipulate signifieds, the last 
two to question the fixity of the signifiers. It is the Venturi and Moore styles which are most 
easily cheapened.
This begins to wear thin as it becomes a standardized language for commercial 
developments whose claim to historical memory have no more validity than their older 
cousins' claim to functional rationality.
 Leon Krier's acerbic sketches pillory awkward postmodern juxtapositions of one 
shape after another (cf. Porphyrios 1984). His own solution offers a classical vocabulary 
that is capable of wide variations. It seems doubtful that this would bring the heterogeneity 
Americans treasure in their cities, but it raises the key questions: what does it mean for a 
city or a neighborhood or a region to cohere architecturally? Is coherence the only 
alternative to jumble?
 The way artists change their rules makes it impossible to find useful general criteria 
of coherence for works of art. Even the negative criterion of avoiding contradiction has 
problems with metaphorical discourse, so it is of little help in art, where contradiction is 
not precisely defined (and in so far as it is, can be used toward new forms). We are not 
going to come up with any clear positive or negative criteria for a coherent city. Even 
functional inconveniences might work well on other levels, as when disruptions in smooth 
traffic patterns create opportunities for interaction and festivity.
 The problem of coherence is finally the same as the problem of appropriate and 
disciplined judgment, as when we estimate the success of metaphorical changes in a 
vocabulary. There are no rules, but that is not to say that the judgment is arbitrary, or that 
one person may not possess more than another.
 We saw in the last chapter how strong rereadings of history can extend 
architectural language. The same strategy can also be applied synchronically to the city. 
The urban context can be treated much as I suggested that historical precedents be treated. 
We care how what we build relates to what is around, but we cannot rely on some secret 
essence or unified spirit of the locality; it could be that we reread the context and our 
building changes the place by completing a form or function that was not quite there 
before.
 There is a danger that competing "summaries" of the city could set off a new level 
of jumble. But no one is on a meta-level with respect to all the rest, and my attempted 
general statement becomes another local performance to be reread in turn.
In a sense the city could become not an collection of monuments but "an immense 
construction site of traces and residues" always being reworked with a care for our fragile 
inhabitation.(The quoted phrase originally was used to describe the situation of the third 
world today. It is from Remo Guidieri, reproduced in Vattimo 1988, 158.)
 The classical ideal of hierarchical centered unity has a strong hold on our image of 
the city. The idea of a unified city with its integrated design and culture does not describe 
our lives any more, but we yearn for its order. This makes it difficult to envision other kinds 
of urban wholes. Habermas remarks that "the urban agglomerations have outgrown the old 
concept of the city that people so cherish" (Habermas 1985a, 327). 
I mentioned above Rowe's "collage city;" there is also Kisho Kurokawa's notion of 
an intermediate continuum, and the process of planning by incremental rereading, as 
discussed by Christopher Alexander (1988).[begin note]  Kurokawa has written about the 
different kind of coming together that he finds in the Japanese tradition. He discusses 
spaces and continua that link disparate elements into "intermediate" states (1988, 64ff).
 Japanese culture has taken in and preserved a multiplicity of meanings and forms 
without reducing them to one core identity or to one organized system. As Kurokawa 
shows, this is reflected in the design even of single rooms. He also makes provocative 
remarks concerning the analogues, in city planning, of Western surgical intervention and 
Chinese herbal medicine (88). He does not, however, discuss the hierarchical ingredient in 
Japanese culture that always tries, announces its success, and fails to overcome the 
disparateness of spatial and cultural intermediate zones.[end note]
 Still, the classical exemplars cannot be simply denied; doing so allows them to 
continue to dominate us as that which is to be avoided. They need to be opened up; we 
have to find their limits. Perhaps paradoxically, if we had more buildings built in a 
deconstructive manner they could enhance the togetherness of the city, although not its 
coherence in any usual sense. If we had more buildings that were self-consciously 
marginal, participating in but making visible the codes that pervade the city, we would be 
more aware of our common definitions, and their limits, and of our common plight. Such 
buildings would not be a solution to the problem of designing the average building that 
fills the urban fabric, but they might help us build together without enforcing any one 
central identity.
Regionalism and the Consumer Society
I spoke in the previous chapter of a strategy that Kenneth Frampton refers to as 
"critical regionalism." Unlike a simple regionalism that seeks to maintain unquestioned 
coherence with given local forms, critical regionalism works with the tension between 
universal and local culture. As a general strategy I find this appealing because it 
recognizes that we are not wholly immersed in either a regional or a universal context.
 But Frampton's chosen examples do not always encourage his strategy. For one 
thing, his examples seem too timid in their use of regional vocabulary. For instance, if we 
compare the principles and the examples found in Frampton (1982), we find that while the 
examples are all of high quality, they remain modernist experiments with function and 
form. With the exception of Utzon's church, they could be transplanted to other contexts 
without much difficulty. (The examples cited in Frampton (1982) include Gwathmey's 
Perinton Housing, Ciriani's Noisy I, Kleihues' Vinetaplatz Block, Utzon's Bagsvaerd 
Church, and Pelli's San Bernardino City Hall. Compare these examples to the BBPR Chase 
Manhattan Bank in Milan (presented in Klotz 1988); the bank keeps to the modernist 
vocabulary but manages to make local and contextual references more strongly than do 
Frampton's examples.[)
 That Frampton is basically a modernist is a description that I presume he, like 
Habermas, would cheerfully accept, since for both of them the alternatives to modernism 
are regressive tradition (what I called "simple regionalism") or nihilistic play. Neither of 
these alternatives allows the kind of self-criticism they deem necessary in our world today. 
But are these the only choices?
 Frampton pictures waves of commercial jumble beating against resistant enclaves. 
He urges us to create "bounded urban fragment against which the inundation of the place-
less, consumerist environment will find itself momentarily checked" (1982, 82). He sees 
the need for "monuments . . . bounded realms and large-scale representative forms . . . 
within which the memory and practice of a liberative culture can still be nurtured and 
sustained" (1982, 26). Instead of the dialectic of local and universal Frampton described in 
the statement quoted in the last chapter, these statements conceptualize the city as a war 
between two factors, straightforward regional identities and undifferentiated consumerism. 
We recognize again the problematic dichotomy between simple inhabitation and 
placeless distance.
 Frampton's monuments and bounded realms are supposed to have a solid 
meaning. To those inside the region, that meaning acts as a support, and to the 
consumerist culture outside it acts as a brake, because that identity cannot be exchanged 
away. Frampton overemphasizes the immediacy of regional culture, but the "critical" side 
of his regionalism can correct that emphasis. The real problem is the idea of one 
undifferentiated consumer culture. This is a common enough idea today, and it is one 
more version of the modern attempt to separate form from content.
 No one can deny the contemporary tendency to homogenize the environment. But 
is this equivalent to a way of life and culture defined purely in terms of maximizing 
consumption without any substantive content? The notion of a consumer culture is the 
backside of the modern ideal of triumphant rationality. If we have questioned the 
adequacy of the modern picture of a purely rational society whose projects are defined in 
purely formal ways, we should also question the adequacy of the notion of consumer 
culture.
 Consumer culture does not exist as a total way of life made up only of maximizing 
consumption and the flow of goods. What does exist is a consumerist way of living local 
cultures. Only if it could have its own character independent of that multiplicity from 
which it arises could we say consumer culture had its own universal identity. But while the 
architecture and the products may be the same, they make different moves in different 
local games.
 Cultural patterns and goals have their meaning by contrast. We can find the same 
fast-food emporia in New York and Tokyo, but they are inserted into different local 
networks. Everyone may use VCR's and eat at Macdonald's, but this does not mean that 
the motivation for buying is the same, nor that their use is the same, nor that their use 
stands in the same contrasts.
 The massive influence of American products and ways of behavior all over the 
world should not be taken as proof that some abstractly defined consumer culture is 
conquering all. Insofar there is influence of one culture upon another, what is spreading is 
a local American culture with its own substantive content of ideals, virtues and vices--
listen to the lyrics. This form of life amounts to more than sheer consumerism. It is true that 
this culture can be debased, but that does not render it purely abstract. It is also true that 
as it spreads it can weaken traditional cultures, but we should not be too quick to claim 
that those weakened versions become indistinguishable from one another.
 We fear that the acid might eat away all the local culture, leaving only consumerist 
maximization. This is another version of Plato's fear. History would have made a change 
that abolished itself by wiping out its own genesis and internal relations. This is the 
modernist illusion. Our era is seen as the final expression of a universal human condition; 
once history has accomplished the liberation of some unchanging basic process, history 
becomes irrelevant. This depends on being able to separate form from content and so 
constitute a process with its own a-historical goals. It is against this that I have urged 
variations of Heidegger's notion of a "thrown project," though with more pluralism than 
Heidegger would allow. My attempt to keep hermeneutical depth in history is not the 
attempt to find a unified form or process there. Cf. Vattimo 1988. 
 It is misleading to think of our community values and practices as a matter of 
simple immediate inhabitation. It is also misleading to think of some pure force arrayed 
against this resistant core. Habermas's distinction between lifeworld and system is useful 
here. Instead of thinking about consumerism as a unified culture, think about systemic 
pressures on the lifeworld. These pressures are not a set of contrasts that produce meaning. 
They are a network of mechanisms aimed at maximizing flow and return, mechanisms 
which treat cultural values and roles as impediments.
 What makes the system seem to be a modern incarnation of the power of the 
Sophist is its protean maneuverability. The system "itself" cannot be represented. It operates 
through endless substitutions and strategies. But we can find it in our wounded places. We 
experience it in the weakening of identities. Also, we experience it because architecture 
and city planning deal not only with the infinity of exchange and spectacle but also with 
particular limits: where does the sunlight fall, and will the building overload the sewers? 
These reveal systemic effects and constraints.
 In talking about the inscription of the system on our social body I am in danger of 
romanticizing some virginal social unit. Foucault attacks an analogous illusion in his 
discussion of sexuality when he argues that we have no unified sexuality waiting to be 
uncovered, but only scattered economies of desire and pleasure to be let free in their 
multiplicity (Foucault 1980). Actually, though, his point supports mine. I agree that there is 
no unified social body to be recovered. But systemic imperatives work at simplifying our 
social inhabitation into a commodified simulacrum of itself, all surface and show and 
peak experience. The loss of multiplicity and interpretative potential reveals the systemic 
pressures.
 While we can experience its effects, it seems impossible to picture the operation of 
the system as a whole.  Habermas remarked about Venturi that "the language of this stage-
set architecture indulges in a rhetoric that still seeks to express in ciphers systemic 
relations that can no longer be architecturally formulated" (Habermas 1985a, 328).  s this 
because the system is a pure power, above history and capable of infinite flexibility? 
Among other reasons, the operations of the current economic and productive 
arrangements are hard to describe because, unlike earlier arrangements, they separate 
their imperatives from political and religious projects. Because it has no intentions, the 
system is not an agent with an agenda. As a complex of impersonal mechanisms it cannot 
be treated as a unified actor (although insofar as the system appears in the actions of this 
or that corporate or governmental agent it can be dealt with as we do any "crude" power 
or persuasion). But the current systemic arrangements do have a definite shape, in the 
sense that they can be distinguished from other past or possible economic and productive 
arrangements.
 We can't be or embody the system. To imagine that we could live the systemic 
imperatives in their naked state is the same mistake as to imagine that the operative form 
of a building could be nakedly expressed in its perceived form without entering into any 
new contrasts and meanings. Insofar as the systemic imperatives appear as something 
lived, they are already within other contexts and cultural networks. Those systems are 
inhabited with the spaciousness that is a condition for any inhabitation. This means that 
there are always discontinuities (and continuities and intersections and contrasts and 
differences) that provide room for metaphor and self-criticism.
Self-Criticism Together
I argued earlier that we have no single unified project of self-criticism that might be 
blocked or subverted. Because the occasions and projects of criticism arise in multiple and 
indirect ways, they cannot be systematically suppressed. We should not presume that the 
only way to liberate ourselves is to have a theory of the structure of the whole, so that we 
can oppose this total vision to current fragmentation or to oppressive totalities. There can 
be a liberation resulting from the tensions and crossings we find ourselves within. We can 
care for the whole without a map of the whole.
 My effort has been to discourage absolute claims, including those made in 
postmodernist attacks on modernist absolutism. There is a difference between being above 
and being amid it all. We are building together in the shifting discourse and the shifting 
life. There is no guaranteed overview, but nothing is in principle hidden. We must be 
careful not to conceptualize this as a conflict of solid inhabitation and placeless forces.
 Do we then follow Habermas's pattern, which is the old Socratic story? Yes and no. 
What we have is endless critique without any definitive distinction of persuasion from 
rational argument; this makes for discourse guided by intellectual virtues rather than 
transparent principles. We need dialogue, but I am suggesting a shifting that has less 
structural unity and yet is more tied to historical roots than Habermas (or Lyotard) would 
allow. But we cannot deny the role of local reflection and argument in freeing us from 
restrictive contexts and making it possible to build together in new ways.
 In building together we cannot each go our separate ways. We should accept 
Habermas's goal of open discussion and community participation, with no one barred 
from the circles of decision about building. That is far enough from the reality of today to 
be worth fighting for.[begin note]  "Here and now in the face of the postmodern logic of 
interminable deferment and infinite regress, of floating signifiers and vanishing signifieds, 
here and now I face an other who demands of me an ethical response. This call of the 
other to be heard, and to be respected in his/her otherness, is irreducible to the parodic 
play of empty imitations. It breaks through the surface of mirror images, and, outfacing the 
void, reintroduces a dimension of depth and height. The face of the other resists 
assimilation to the dehumanizing processes of commodification" (Kearney 1987, 42).
 Habermas is right that we need to encourage self-examination and reflection on 
our own vulnerabilities and limitations. But rational agreement is only one kind of 
appropriate, disciplined judgment, and being convinced to change our beliefs is only one 
way of altering the language we speak.
 I recall the Apollo astronauts' photo of the earth rising in the distance above the 
moon's horizon. That picture appeared so many times in magazines and on posters. It 
spoke to an awareness of our situation in a fragile whole, but the photo did not argue for 
any of the rival claims to total vision. Often the photo was presented in appeals for nuclear 
and ecological good sense, in the hope that concern for all life's flourishing might help us 
avoid catastrophe. But this awareness and concern is not only for the grand scale; we need 
such it in the city, too. There we should take account of one another with an eye to the 
fragility of the whole, without imposing any particular systematic view of that whole.
 
